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Abstract: This paper presents verification and validation results of a model based fault
detection and diagnosis (FDD) system for reliable detection and identification of aircraft control
surface jamming at small deflections. Three main factors contributed decisively to a high
reliability of the evaluated FDD system: (1) employing an accurate model of the surface-actuator
dynamics in form of a linear parameter-varying model for the synthesis of the fault detection
filter; (2) performing an integrated closed-loop tuning of the free parameters of the FDD system
using multi-objective optimization techniques to guarantee the lack of false alarms and missed
detections, as well as satisfactory detection time performance; and (3) employing numerically
sound real-time signal processing techniques to perform fault identification. The verification of
the FDD system has been done using standard Monte Carlo simulations, while for validation
global optimization-driven worst-case search based robustness analysis has been employed. The
final industrial validation has been performed on the AIRBUS actuator test bench and confirmed
the satisfactory performance of the FDD system in a true industrial setting.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The jamming (or lock-in-place failure) of an aircraft con-
trol surface creates a dissymmetry in the aircraft con-
figuration, which must be compensated by appropriate
deflections of other control surfaces. Therefore, the jam-
ming leads to the degradation of the aircraft performance
due to the increased drag, which depends on the ampli-
tude and localization of the failure. For example, during
a long time aircraft operation, a surface jamming may
produce substantial drag which can lead to excessive fuel
consumptions (with all associated negative environmental
effects) and can even impede the fulfillment of the flight
mission (i.e., the need for landing on a diverting airport
for refueling). Therefore, the timely detection of jamming,
especially of the primary control surfaces (e.g., elevator,
ruder, ailerons), is important for both an economical and
easy-to-handle operation of an aircraft.
To enhance the pilot situational awareness and conse-
quently to perform, if possible, appropriate reconfigura-
tion measures (e.g., passivation of the actuator and/or
redistribution of control actions), the jamming must be
not only robustly detected (i.e., in the presence of many
flight related uncertainties), but also reliably identified.
The task of fault identification is to confirm the occurrence
of jamming and therefore is crucial for ruling out other
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type of faults (e.g., runaway, loss of efficiency, oscillatory
fault), which require different handling. The jamming of a
control surface at null deflection is a special case, which
leads to additional challenges regarding its identification.
For example, this case requires a special handling due
to the difficulty of detecting this fault during cruise op-
erations (i.e., straight level flight), when the intervening
actuator input and output signals have very low (nearly
zero) energy. For this reason, the detection of jamming
at null deflection is only possible during maneuvers (e.g.,
turns), which involve a sufficiently high level of control
activity.
In the framework of the European FP7 project ADDSAFE
(Advanced Fault Diagnosis for Sustainable Flight Guid-
ance and Control), the detection of actuator jamming at
a small surface deflection, and in particular, the jamming
in null position, were formulated as fault detection and
diagnosis (FDD) benchmark problems. For the solution
of some of these problems, new solutions have been de-
veloped which are described in (Alwi and Edwards, 2012;
Henry et al., 2012; Vanek et al., 2012; Varga et al., 2011;
Varga and Ossmann, 2012). In this paper, we additionally
address the fault identification aspect, which was not part
of the ADDSAFE benchmark formulation (Goupil and
Marcos, 2011).
In the current industrial practice, threshold based signal
monitoring schemes are widely used. An error signal is
computed (generally as a function of the actuator com-
mand and the achieved surface deflection) which must
be greater than a given threshold during a given time
to confirm the detection of a surface jamming. The use
of first order linear time-invariant (LTI) actuator models
for model-based fault detection purposes has been also
considered for the detection of actuator jamming failures.
Because LTI models completely ignores the complex de-
pendency between the actuator dynamics and the aerody-
namics forces acting on the control surfaces, their use may
raise difficulties in guaranteeing the lack of false alarms
over a wide range of variation of flight parameters and
in the presence of large parameter variations. Recently
proposed advanced techniques based on the use of so-called
linear parameter varying (LPV) models are therefore bet-
ter suited for guaranteeing robustness of fault detection
performance of flight actuator jamming (Varga et al., 2011;
Alwi and Edwards, 2012; Henry et al., 2012; Vanek et al.,
2012).
In this paper we present verification and validation (V&V)
results of a model based fault detection and diagnosis
(FDD) system for reliable detection and identification
of flight actuator jamming at small surface deflections
(including jamming at null deflection). For the detection
of jamming we employ the discrete-time version of the
LPV-model based fault detection approach of Varga et al.
(2011), extended with the fault identification functionality.
An integrated closed-loop tuning of the free parameters of
the FDD system using multi-objective optimization tech-
niques has been performed to guarantee the lack of false
alarms and missed detections, as well as satisfactory detec-
tion time performance. The fault identification aspect has
been addressed using numerically sound real-time signal
processing techniques. The V&V of the FDD system has
been done using both standard Monte Carlo based meth-
ods and advanced worst-case search based optimization-
driven robustness analysis. Both analyses have shown the
high robustness of the FDD system. The final industrial
validation, performed on the AIRBUS actuator test bench,
confirmed the satisfactory performance of the FDD system
in a true industrial setting.
2. FDD SYSTEM SETUP
The FDD system in Fig. 1 for the detection and iden-
tification of actuator jamming must work in conjunction
with a stable closed-loop flight control system, whose main
components are the open-loop aircraft, the controller, the
actuator and sensor blocks. The controller processes the
pilot command vector up(t) used to perform various ma-
neuvers and the measured outputs vector y
m
(t) delivered
by the sensors using the aircraft output vector y(t), and
produces the actuator command vector uc(t). The actu-
ator output signals form the vector u(t) representing the
corresponding surface deflections. The FDD system, whose
detailed structure is presented in Fig. 2, processes a single
actuator output signal u(t) and the corresponding actuator
command uc(t), which are selected via the selector block
from the components of the actuator output vector u(t)
and actuator command vector uc(t), respectively. Addi-
tionally, the aircraft parameters p(t) are used for gain
scheduling purposes. The output of the FDD system is
the confirmation signal η(t), which indicates the presence
or absence of actuator jamming.
Fig. 1. Fault monitoring setup for FDD of jamming of a
single actuator
The FDD system used to detect and identify actuator
jamming is depicted in Fig. 2, where besides the residual
generator, blocks for residual evaluation, decision making
and fault identification are present. The fault identification
involves the determination of the main characteristics of
a surface jamming: the (mean) value ujam of the control
surface deflection angle and the corresponding variance σ,
which in the case of jamming must be a value nearby to
the variance of the measurement noise.
Fig. 2. FDD system for monitoring of jamming
The main components of the FDD system are now de-
scribed with more details in what follows.
Residual generator: The fault detection filter (called
also residual generator) generates the residual signal r(t)
using the measurable quantities u(t) actuator output,
uc(t) actuator command, and p(t) a vector of measurable
parameters. The function of the residual generator block
is to produce a zero residual signal if there is no fault,
and a non-zero residual signal when a fault is present.
In practice, the presence of various uncertainties and
measurement noise leads to nonzero residual signals even
in the non-faulty case and therefore a suitable threshold on
the magnitude of the residual signal is used to distinguish
between nearly zero and nonzero signals.
The underlying model employed to describe the flight ac-
tuator and control surface dynamics can be approximated
by a first order nonlinear differential equation model in a
quasi -LPV form
u˙(t) = K(u(t), p(t))(uc(t)− u(t)), (1)
where K(u, p) is the actuator gain, which depends on the
surface deflection u and parameter vector p. Details of this
model are available in (Goupil, 2010). It is shown in (Varga
et al., 2011) that, with highly accuracy, K(u, p) can be
approximated as
K(u, p) = C0(p) + C1(p) sign(u˙)(u+ C2(p)), (2)
where C0(p), C1(p) and C2(p) are affine approximations
in the components of the parameter vector p. These
components are the gain scheduling variables, which for
this study have been chosen as the mass m, the position
of center of gravity along x-axis Xcg, the calibrated air
speed Vcas and the aircraft altitude h.
Using the transfer-function based expression developed in
(Varga et al., 2011), the fault detection filter can be chosen
in the quasi -LPV form
z˙(t) = −az(t)− aK(u(t), p(t))
k0
uc(t)
+
a(K(u(t), p(t))− a)
k0
u(t)
r(t) = z(t) +
a
k0
u(t).
(3)
In (3), a is a free constant parameter which specifies the
dynamics of the filter, while k0 is a gain normalization
factor (for example, a nominal value of the nonlinear gain
K(u, p)).
For a discrete-time implementation with a sampling time
T , we assume that the values of u(t) = u(iT ), uc(t) =
uc(iT ) and K(u(t), p(t)) = K(u(iT ), p(iT )) are constant
on each sampling period for t ∈ [ iT, (i + 1)T ), for
i = 1, 2, . . .. The discretized fault detection filter can be
implemented as
z((i+1)T ) = e−aT z(iT )− (1−e
−aT )K(u(iT ), p(iT ))
k0
uc(iT )
+
(1−e−aT )(K(u(iT ), p(iT ))− a)
k0
u(iT )
r(iT ) = z(iT ) +
a
k0
u(iT ),
(4)
For a discrete-time implementation of the gain (2), we can
evaluate sign(u˙(iT )) as sign(u(iT )− u((i− 1)T )) .
Typical values of the free parameters are: T = 0.01 ÷
0.04sec, a = 10÷ 20 and k0 = 14÷ 30.
Interestingly, the same residual generator can be used for
the detection of different categories of faults, as jamming,
runaway, oscillatory failure, surface angle sensor bias (liq-
uid jamming) as suggested in (Varga et al., 2011; Varga
and Ossmann, 2012).
Residual evaluator: The residual evaluator generates
the evaluation signal θr(t) representing an approximation
of the signal norm of r(t). For decision making, an easy to
compute measure of the residual signal energy ‖r(t)‖2 is
necessary. For this purpose, the use of Narendra type fault
evaluators is recommendable. These are first order filters
of the form
ξr((i+ 1)T ) = γrξr(iT ) + |r(iT )|
θr(iT ) = ξr(iT ) + αr|r(iT )| , (5)
where αr is a weight on the current residual values and γr
is a suitable forgetting factor. Typical values of these free
parameters are αr = 0.1÷ 0.5 and γr = 0.995÷ 0.999.
Decision making: The decision making block generates
the decision signal ι(t) indicating the presence (ι(t) = 1)
or absence (ι(t) = 0) of a fault using a simple threshold
based logic
ι(iT ) =
{
0, if θr(iT ) < τ
1, if θr(iT ) ≥ τ , (6)
where τ is a suitable decision threshold.
Fault identification: The fault identification block
generates the confirmation signal η(t) = 1, if jamming
is confirmed or η(t) = 0, if jamming is not confirmed.
The fault identification is triggered at time t = td, when
the presence of a fault has been detected (i.e., the output
of the decision block in Fig. 2 is ι(t) = 1 for t ≥ td).
To confirm jamming at a constant deflection ujam, the
following computations are needed:
1. Collect n samples of the output variable u(t):
u1 = u(td + T
′), . . . , un = u(td + nT ′).
2. Compute ujam as the mean of n samples:
ujam =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ui.
3. Compute the variance of n samples:
σ = 1n−1
∑n
i=1(ui − ujam)2.
4. If σ ≤ τu, then set η(t) = 1; else, set η(t) = 0.
Here, T ′ is the sampling period used to collect the n
samples (usually T ′ ≤ T ) and τu is a threshold for zero (or
negligible) variance. Typical values of the main parameters
of the identification procedure are T ′ = 0.01, n = 50÷300
and τu = 0.01÷ 0.05.
This computational approach requires the storage of n
samples, which is not desirable for real time computations.
Fortunately, it is possible to use recursive evaluation for-
mulas of the mean and sample variance which avoid any
additional storage needs and are based on a numerically
stable computational method (Welford, 1962). The imple-
mentation of this algorithm starts with the initializations
m1 = u1 and s1 = 0, and recursively computes
mk = mk−1 + (uk −mk−1)/k
sk = sk−1 + (uk −mk−1)(uk −mk)
for k = 2, . . . , n. Then, ujam = mn and σ = sn/(n − 1).
With this approach, the confirmation time tc of a surface
jamming is roughly equal to tc = td + nT
′.
The special case of jamming of a control surface at null
deflection can alternatively be handled by computing the
evaluation signals θuc and θu for t = 0, T, 2T, . . . using
Narendra-type filters similar as used in (5)
θuc((i+ 1)T ) = γucθuc(iT ) + |uc(iT )|
θu((i+ 1)T ) = γuθu(iT ) + |u(iT )|
(7)
The jamming at null deflection can be confirmed if the
conditions for non-zero input θuc ≥ τuc and zero output
θu < τu are simultaneously fulfilled, where τuc and τu
are appropriate thresholds for nonzero and zero energy
signals, respectively. A typical setting of the corresponding
forgetting factors γuc and γu must fulfill the condition
1 > γu > γuc imposed by the signal transmission causality
requirements.
3. TUNING OF FREE PARAMETERS
The free parameters of the fault evaluation and decision
block can be determined in an optimal way, such that
typical requirements as lack of false alarms and missed
detections, as well as constraints on detection times are ful-
filled. Multi-objective optimization based tuning strategies
have been described, for example, in (Varga and Ossmann,
2012), where the term integrated tuning has been employed
to emphasize that the FDD system runs with a robustly
stable closed-loop system as shown in Fig. 1.
For the tuning of the FDD system, the values of the
parameters αr and γr of the residual evaluation block
have been determined by maximizing the gap τd − τf ,
where τf is the false alarm bound, representing the largest
magnitude of θr over all normal operation points of the air-
craft, all relevant pilot maneuvers, all admissible variations
of uncertain parameters (e.g., aerodynamical coefficients,
measurements), for all relevant disturbances (e.g., typical
wind spectra), while τd is the detection bound, representing
the smallest amplitude of θr over all relevant fault cases.
The maximization of τd − τf has to be done such that the
fault detection time satisfies td ≤ tdetec, where tdetec is the
maximum allowable detection time. Here, td stays for the
maximum detection time over all uncertainties mentioned
previously.
For the discrete-time fault detection filter in (4), we
employed the typical values: T = 0.01sec, a = 14 and
k0 = 14. The optimal setting of the parameter of the
residual evaluation filter (5) is αr = 0.3 and γr = 0.998
and the choice τ = 0.1 of the detection threshold satisfies
τf ≤ τ ≤ τd. This leads to a completely satisfactory fault
detection performance.
4. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
The determination of the threshold τ relies on worst-case
search-based evaluations of the false alarm and detection
bounds, and therefore its choice above guarantees the
fulfillment of all basic performance requirements. To pro-
vide supplementary information on the robustness of the
overall detection time performance of the FDD system,
optimization-based search techniques have been used to
determine the global worst-case detection time. The anal-
ysis itself relies on repeated simulations of the nonlinear
model of the closed-loop aircraft including a nonlinear
control law ensuring robust stability over the whole flight
envelope (see Fig. 1). The main uncertainties are the flight
conditions (altitude, speed) over the whole flight envelope
and the full range of variations of the aircraft mass and
center of gravity position. While the limits of the altitude
h and the mass m are fixed, the limits of the center of
gravity Xcg depend on the actual mass, while the limits
of the calibrated airspeed Vcas depend on the actual mass
and altitude. This leads to somewhat reduced bounds for
these parameters depending on the concrete flight condi-
tion (Varga et al., 2011). Additionally, uncertainties in the
aerodynamic database, in the measurements of altitude
and velocity, and in the accuracy of the estimations of the
mass and center of gravity have been considered.
4.1 Verification using Monte Carlo simulation
In the ADDSAFE Project, the Functional Engineering
Simulator (FES) environment described in (Goupil and
Marcos, 2012) has been used for the verification of the
FDD designs. The FES is based on Matlab-Simulink and
built around the aircraft closed-loop nonlinear simulation
benchmark model augmented with the designed FDD sys-
tem as shown in Fig. 1. For randomly generated combi-
nations of the uncertain parameters, the analysis tools
implemented in FES evaluate several indicators which
allow to assess the performance characteristics of the FDD
system. In this section we summarize the results of an
extensive industrial benchmarking of the designed FDD
system obtained using the FES.
Within the validation campaign with FES a total of 1200
validated points in the flight envelope have been used to
test the robustness of the designed FDD system in fault
free cases during six demanding maneuvers (e.g., pitch
protection and angle of attack protection maneuvers).
None of these test points/maneuvers triggered any false
alarms. To test the detection performance, the jamming at
small deflections of the elevator during cruise and smooth
turn maneuvers has been tested in 1000 different flight
points. In particular, jamming at null deflection occurring
in cruise had to be detected during turn maneuvers. Note
that jamming at small deflections during smooth maneu-
vers poses challenges for the fault detection, due to the
small amplitudes of the residual signals. The Monte Carlo
analysis provided a mean detection and identification time
of 3.57sec with a standard deviation of 0.92sec and a max-
imum detection time of 10.65sec. In Fig. 3 the histogram
of the identification times determined by the Monte Carlo
simulations are depicted. It can be observed that most of
the 1200 fault cases are detected and identified nearly in
minimum time of 3.01sec, and only a few ones are delayed.
These delays are caused by the presence of very small
control inputs and hence, small residuals, especially at high
velocities in the flight envelope.
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Fig. 3. Histogram of the fault identification times
4.2 Validation using worst-case search
While Monte Carlo simulation can be seen as a useful veri-
fication technique (e.g., well suited for rapid prototyping),
for validation purposes it is necessary to use alternative
approaches which are able to cover continuous uncertain
parameter ranges, provide guarantees for lack of hidden
weaknesses and determine worst-case parameter combina-
tions to serve for design enhancements. Therefore, for the
validation of the FDD design, a global optimization-based
worst-case search is a suitable approach which fulfils all
above requirements and delivers (usually in shorter times
than with Monte Carlo simulation) accurate estimations
of worst-case parameter combinations, for example, by
maximizing the fault detection and identification time.
The optimization environment MOPS (Multi-Objective
Parameter Search) of DLR (Joos, 1999) provides an easy
access to different optimization algorithms together with
visualization tools of the computed results and even of the
intermediary iterations. For the maximization of the fault
detection and identification time, the differential evolution
(DE) global search method has been employed (Storn and
Price, 1997). This method allows to perform many func-
tion evaluations in parallel, which significantly contributes
to alleviate the associated computational burden due to
expensive simulation runs. The optimization has been
performed on a Linux cluster with 16 CPUs at 2.6 GHz
running MATLAB Parallel Toolbox. An optimization run,
involving about 1500 function evaluations, took around 15
minutes.
The resulting worst case detection and identification time
of the jamming for the designed FDD system was 18.09sec,
which is still completely satisfactory for an industrial us-
age. Note that this time is about 40% higher than 10.65sec,
the time found by Monte Carlo simulations. Fig. 4 depicts
the search points in the normalized flight envelope and
normalized weight-and-balance diagram, which have been
generated by the DE method during the worst case op-
timization. Values of the identification time larger than
10sec are marked with red crosses, while values lower than
10sec are marked with blue circles. As it can be seen, the
more critical region of the flight envelope from the point of
view of a fast identification of the jamming corresponds to
high velocities in combination with a more forward center
of gravity position. This parameter combination makes
the control task easier by needing smaller size inputs to
steer the aircraft, but adversely affects the detection and
identification times of the faults.
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Fig. 4. Search points generated by the DE method
5. INDUSTRIAL EVALUATION
The industrial V&V activities that have been subsequently
performed are part of a typical aircraft industrial develop-
ment process. An important prerequisite for this is the
implementation of the FDD system on the flight control
computer of the fly-by-wire aircraft system environment.
Code generation tools have been used for this purpose,
which allow the automated generation of certifiable real-
time codes. In a first step, a graphical tool has been used
to specify the block diagram structure of the FDD system
(computer aided-specification). In contrast to the equiva-
lent Simulink-based block diagram modelling, only a lim-
ited set of certified elementary blocks (so-called graphical
symbols) can be used to describe the functionality of the
underlying fault detection and identification algorithms.
Dedicated functional specification sheets have been used
for this purpose. The FDD system specification is under
the control of a configuration management tool, which
allows a partially automated syntax checking too. In a
second step, a code generation tool produces the associ-
ated code to be directly implemented in the flight control
computer.
The industrial evaluation has been performed using
hardware-in-the-loop simulations with a flight actuator
test bench as the one presented in Fig. 5. The test bench is
built around a real elevator actuator with simulated com-
mand inputs, aerodynamic forces and hydraulic pressures,
providing continuous monitoring of computer internal vari-
ables. This bench offers the possibility to validate the FDD
system in degraded configurations, as in the case of low
hydraulic pressure and high loads on the control surface.
Fig. 5. Flight actuator test bench
The industrial validation campaign consisted of the assess-
ment of the robustness (i.e., the lack of false alarms) and
of the detection performance (i.e., the lack of missed de-
tections and satisfactory detection time). The robustness
of the FDD designs has been assessed during pure lateral
manoeuvres, pure longitudinal manoeuvres and during
mixed manoeuvres (combining lateral and longitudinal
movement in the same manoeuvres). Both smooth and
dynamic manoeuvres have been performed, as for example,
auto-pilot manoeuvres, flight control checks, take-off and
landing, certification manoeuvres, etc. The detection per-
formances have been assessed by simulating the jamming
failure scenario, during a classical flight and during specific
manoeuvres. The results have shown a high degree of
robustness of the designed FDD system for the whole range
of tests and a highly satisfactory detection performance.
A typical detection result of a jamming at a surface
deflection of −2◦ is presented in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Detection and identification of a jamming at −2◦
In Fig. 7 we present an example for the detection of a
jamming at a null surface deflection. As it can be observed,
the dedicated identification scheme based on Narendra-
type filters (7) has a significantly shorter identification
time tid0 than the identification time tid resulting when
employing a general purpose fault identification method
of jamming at arbitrary deflections.
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Fig. 7. Detection and identification of a jamming at 0◦
6. CONCLUSION
This paper clearly demonstrates via an extensive V&V
campaign, that the methodology developed in (Varga
et al., 2011; Varga and Ossmann, 2012) for the synthesis
of FDD systems using LPV-model based synthesis can be
successfully applied to develop a robust FDD system for
the identification of the jamming of an elevator actuator.
For this case, the strong requirements for no false alarms,
no missed detections and short fault detection times can
be completely fulfilled over the whole flight envelope and
in the presence of significant parametric uncertainties and
measurement noise. By performing a preliminary robust-
ness assessment using either the Monte Carlo simula-
tion based analysis or advanced global optimization-based
worst-case search, substantial cost reductions of the final
industrial V&V can be expected. The industrial V&V
results show a good potential of the developed FDD system
for industrial use.
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